National Technical University of Athens

Athens, Greece

August 21-22, 2014


ACAC is an annual meeting in Athens aiming to bring together researchers working in all areas of the theory of algorithms and computational complexity. It serves as a lively forum for presenting research results that are in a preliminary stage or have been recently accepted / presented in some major conference. Contributions may appear, fully or partially, in informal electronic proceedings available only to the participants (subject to authors' approval). The language of the workshop is English.


There are no registration fees. However, participants should register for administrative purposes, by filling the registration form no later than 15/8, starting on Monday, 14/7.


Participants interested in giving a presentation should register, providing a tentative title and a short abstract by sending an e-mail to, no later than 10/8.
The organizers will make every possible effort so that all interested participants present their work (subject to scheduling constraints).

Topics of interest

Include, but are not limited to:

  • Analysis of Algorithms, Randomized and Approximation Algorithms
  • Computational Complexity
  • Data Structures
  • Cryptography
  • Graph Theory
  • Algorithmic Game Theory
  • Computational Geometry
  • Combinatorial Optimization
  • Algorithmic Algebra and Coding Theory
  • Theoretical Aspects of Databases
  • Computational Biology
  • Quantum Computing
  • Parallel and Distributed Computing
  • Machine Learning
  • Applications of Logic


For registration and further details please contact the organizers by email to


Register Here (using English characters):

        Registration is closed



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Thursday, August 21th

8:45Registration - Coffee
9:30-10:30Temporal graphs and temporal networks Go to Abstract
Paul Spirakis, University of Liverpool & CTI
10:30-11:00Coffee Break
11:00-12:30Session 1 (Chair: S. Zachos)
Implementing the L∞ segment Voronoi diagram in CGAL
and an application in VLSI pattern analysis Go to Abstract
Panagiotis Cheilaris, Università della Svizzera italiana
Nearly optimal algorithm for complex root refinement Go to Abstract
Elias Tsigaridas, Inria Paris-Rocquencourt
Polyhedral Omega: A linear Diophantine system solver Go to Abstract
Zafeirakis Zafeirakopoulos, RISC-Linz
12:30-12:45Short Break
12:45-13:45Session 2 (Chair: E. Koutsoupias)
On the Efficiency of Simple Allocation Mechanisms Go to Abstract
for Divisible Goods
Alkmini Sgouritsa, University of Liverpool
Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions Go to Abstract
Yiannis Giannakopoulos, University of Oxford
13:45-15:00Lunch Break
15:00-16:30Session 3 (Chair: V. Markakis)
The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions Go to Abstract
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Stanford University
Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations Go to Abstract
Alexandros Voudouris, University of Patras
A characterization result for strongly monotone
scheduling mechanisms Go to Abstract
Angelina Vidali, Duke University
16:30-16:45Short Break
16:45-18:15Session 4 (Chair: D. Fotakis)
Influence Maximization in Switching-Selection
Threshold Models Go to Abstract
Thodoris Lykouris, Cornell University
Congestion Games with Risk-Averse Players Go to Abstract
Thanasis Lianeas, National Technical University of Athens
Mechanism Design with Verification Go to Abstract
Manolis Zambetakis, National Technical University of Athens
18:15-18:30Short Break
18:30-19:30Short Sessions (Chair: E. Markou)

Friday, August 22th

9:30-10:30Sparsification and subexponential approximation Go to Abstract
Vangelis Paschos, University Paris-Dauphine
10:30-11:00Coffee Break
11:00-12:30Session 5 (Chair: V. Zissimopoulos)
Item Bidding from Combinatorial Public Projects Go to Abstract
Orestis Telelis, Athens University of Economics and Business
Nash equilibria in bimatrix 5x4 games Go to Abstract
Raimundas Vidunas, University of Athens
Reliable Broadcast with Respect to Topology Knowledge Go to Abstract
Giorgos Panagiotakos, National Technical University of Athens
12:30-12:45Short Break
12:45-13:45Session 6 (Chair: I. Milis)
Game Semantics for Logic Programming Go to Abstract
Chrysida Galanaki, University of Athens
Multiprocessor Speed Scaling with Precedence Constraints Go to Abstract
Dimitris Letsios, Technical University of Munich
13:45-15:00Lunch Break
15:00-16:00Reductions from Mechanism to Algorithm Design Go to Abstract
Costantinos Daskalakis, MIT
16:00-16:15Short Break
16:15-17:45Session 7 (Chair: A. Pagourtzis)
Exclusive Graph Searching in Various Graph Classes Go to Abstract
Euripides Markou, University of Thessaly
Short Sessions
20:15Dinner: "O Tsopanakos", Anakreontos 2, Kaisariani (Google Maps)
x Temporal graphs and temporal networks
Paul Spirakis, University of Liverpool & CTI

Joint work with O. Michail, I. Chatzigiannakis and G. Mertzios, results appeared in ICALP 2013 and results that will appear in MFCS 2014.

We discuss here the notion of temporal graphs. These are abstract models of networks that change with time. Here, edges have labels (positive integers indicating discrete times of availability). A basic notion is that of a journey (that is a path in which subsequent edges appear with increasing labels). We examine foremost journeys, Menger's theorem, design issues of temporal nets and also some questions on traversals and the Temporal Travelling salesman Problem.
x Implementing the L∞ segment Voronoi diagram in CGAL and an application in VLSI pattern analysis
Panagiotis Cheilaris, Università della Svizzera italiana

Joint work with Sandeep Kumar Dey, Maria Gabrani, Evanthia Papadopoulou

We present a CGAL (Computational Geometry Algorithm Library) implementation of the line segment Voronoi diagram under the L∞ metric, building on top of the existing line segment Voronoi diagram under the Euclidean (L2) metric in CGAL. CGAL is an open- source collection of geometric algorithms implemented in C++, used in both academia and industry. We also discuss an application of the L∞ segment Voronoi diagram in the area of VLSI pattern analysis. In particular, we identify potentially critical locations in VLSI design patterns, where a pattern (when printed) may differ substantially from the original intended VLSI design.
x Nearly optimal algorithm for complex root refinement
Elias Tsigaridas, Inria Paris-Rocquencourt

Joint work with Victor Y. Pan (CUNY, USA)

What is the bit complexity for approximating up to L bits the complex root of a univariate polynomial with integer coefficients? We present an optimal, up to poly-logarithmic factors, algorithm for this problem.
x Polyhedral Omega: A linear Diophantine system solver
Zafeirakis Zafeirakopoulos, RISC-Linz

Joint work with Felix Breuer

Polyhedral Omega is a new algorithm for solving linear Diophantine systems (LDS), i.e., for computing a multivariate rational function representation of the set of all non-negative integer solutions to a system of linear equations and inequalities. Polyhedral Omega combines methods from partition analysis with methods from polyhedral geometry. In particular, we combine MacMahon's iterative approach based on the Omega operator and explicit formulas for its evaluation with geometric tools such as Brion decompositions and Barvinok's short rational function representations. In this way, we connect two recent branches of research that have so far remained separate, unified by the concept of symbolic cones which we introduce. The resulting LDS solver Polyhedral Omega is significantly faster than previous solvers based on partition analysis and it is competitive with state-of-the-art LDS solvers based on geometric methods. Most importantly, this synthesis of ideas makes Polyhedral Omega by far the simplest algorithm for solving linear Diophantine systems available to date.
x On the Efficiency of Simple Allocation Mechanisms for Divisible Goods
Alkmini Sgouritsa, University of Liverpool

We study the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of simple mechanisms where divisible goods are to be allocated among selfish individuals. In such mechanisms, each bidder submits a single bid for each divisible good to represent her preference and the mechanism determines the fractional allocation and payments for bidders based on their bids. We are interested in simultaneous (i.e. running in parallel) allocation mechanisms when the valuations of the bidders are subadditive and we mainly focus on the well-known proportional-share allocation mechanism.
x Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
Yiannis Giannakopoulos, University of Oxford

We derive exact optimal solutions for the problem of optimizing revenue in single-bidder multi-item auctions for uniform i.i.d. valuations. We give optimal auctions of up to 6 items; previous results were only known for up to three items. To do so, we develop a general duality framework for the general problem of maximizing revenue in many-bidders multi-item additive Bayesian auctions with continuous probability valuation distributions. The framework extends linear programming duality and complementarity to constraints with partial derivatives. The dual system reveals the geometric nature of the problem and highlights its connection with the theory of bipartite graph matchings. The duality framework is used not only for proving optimality, but perhaps more importantly, for deriving the optimal auction; as a result, the optimal auction is defined by natural geometric constraints.
x The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Stanford University

Joint work with Paul Duetting and Tim Roughgarden

Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-parameter mechanism design problems whose allocation rule can be implemented using an adaptive reverse greedy algorithm. Milgrom and Segal [2014] recently introduced these auctions and proved that they satisfy a remarkable list of incentive guarantees: in addition to being dominant-strategy incentive-compatible, they are weakly group-strategyproof, can be implemented by ascending-clock auctions, and admit outcome-equivalent full-information pay-as-bid versions. Neither forward greedy mechanisms nor the VCG mechanism generally possess any of these additional incentive properties. The goal of this paper is to initiate the study of deferred-acceptance auctions from an approximation standpoint. We study these auctions through the lens of two canonical welfare-maximization problems, in knapsack auctions and in combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders.
x Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations
Alexandros Voudouris, University of Patras

According to the proportional allocation mechanism, users compete for a divisible resource by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource that is proportional to her bid and collects an amount equal to her bid as payment. Since users act as utility-maximizers, this naturally defines a proportional allocation game. Recently, Syrgkanis and Tardos (STOC 2013) quantified the inefficiency of equilibria in this game with respect to the social welfare and presented a lower bound of $26.8\%$ on the price of anarchy over coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria in the full and incomplete information settings, respectively. In this paper, we improve this bound to $50\%$ over both equilibrium concepts. Our analysis is simpler and it cannot be improved by arguments that do not take the equilibrium structure into account. We also extend it to settings with budget constraints where we show the first constant bound (between $36\%$ and $50\%$) on the price of anarchy of the corresponding game with respect to an effective welfare benchmark that takes budgets into account.
x A characterization result for strongly monotone scheduling mechanisms
Angelina Vidali, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA

Joint work with Annamária Kovács, Goethe University, Frankfurt/M, Germany

Our work is a step towards the important problem of globaly characterizing truthful mechanisms with multi-parameter, additive player-valuations like unrelated scheduling or additive combinatorial auctions. Very few mechanisms are known for these multi-parameter nondownward closed settings and the question is: Can we prove that no other mechanisms exist? We characterize decisive, strongly monotone mechanisms for two tasks or items as either task independent mechanisms or ’player-grouping minimizers’, a new monotone generalization of affine minimizers. We present a general lemma implying the local linearity of payment functions in ’most’ cases.
x Influence Maximization in Switching-Selection Threshold Models
Thodoris Lykouris, Cornell University

Joint work with Dimitris Fotakis, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova

We study influence maximization problems over social networks, in the presence of competition. Our focus is on diffusion processes within the family of threshold models. Motivated by the general lack of positive results establishing monotonicity and submodularity of the influence function for threshold models, we introduce a general class of switching-selection threshold models where the switching and selection functions may also depend on the node activation history. This extension allows us to establish monotonicity and submodularity when (i) the switching function is linear and depends on the influence by all active neigh- bors, and (ii) the selection function is linear and depends on the influence by the nodes activated only in the last step. This implies a (1 − 1/e − ε)-approximation for the influence maximization problem in the competitive setting. On the nega- tive side, we present a collection of counterexamples establishing that the restric- tions above are essentially necessary. Moreover, we show that switching-selection threshold games with properties (i) and (ii) are valid utility games, and thus their Price of Anarchy is at most 2.
x Congestion Games with Risk-Averse Players
Thanasis Lianeas, National Technical University of Athens

Congestion games ignore the stochastic nature of resource delays and the risk-averse attitude of the players to uncertainty. In the first part of the talk, we introduce two variants of atomic congestion games, one with stochastic players, where each player assigns load to her strategy independently with a given probability, and another with stochastic edges, where the latency functions are random. In both variants, the players are risk-averse, and their individual cost is a player-specific quantile of their delay distribution. We investigate the existence of equilibria and potential functions and the Price of Anarchy. In the second part of the talk, we investigate how and to which extent one can exploit risk-aversion and modify the perceived latencies of the players so that the Price of Anarchy wrt the total latency of the players is improved. The starting point is to introduce some small (and carefully selected) random perturbations to the edge latencies so that the expected latency does not change, but the perceived cost of the players increases, due to risk-aversion.
x Mechanism Design with Verification
Manolis Zambetakis, National Technical University of Athens

We investigate the reasons that make symmetric partial verification essentially useless in virtually all domains. Departing from previous work, we consider any possible (finite or infinite) domain and general symmetric verification. We identify a natural property, namely that the correspondence graph of a symmetric verification M is strongly connected by finite paths along which the preferences are consistent with the preferences at the endpoints, and prove that this property is sufficient for the equivalence of truthfulness and M-truthfulness. In fact, defining appropriate versions of this property, we obtain this result for deterministic and randomized mechanisms with and without money. Moreover,we show that a slightly relaxed version of this property is also necessary for the equivalence of truthfulness and M-truthfulness. Our conditions provide a generic and convenient way of checking whether truthful implementation can take advantage of any symmetric verification scheme in any domain. Since the simplest case of symmetric verification is local verification, our results imply, as a special case, the equivalence of local truthfulness and global truthfulness in the setting without money. To complete the picture, we consider asymmetric verification, and prove that a social choice function is M-truthfully implementable by some asymmetric verification M if and only if f does not admit a cycle of profitable deviations.
x Sparsification and subexponential approximation
Vangelis Paschos, University Paris-Dauphine

Instance sparsification is well-known in the world of exact computation since it is very closely linked to the Exponential Time Hypothesis. In this talk, we extend the concept of sparsification in order to capture subexponential time approximation. We develop a new tool for inapproximability, called approximation preserving sparsification and use it in order to get strong inapproximability results in subexponential time for several fundamental optimization problems as dominating set, feedback vertex set, min set cover.
x Item Bidding from Combinatorial Public Projects
Orestis Telelis, Athens University of Economics and Business

This is a joint work, with Vangelis Markakis.

We analyze equilibria of mechanisms for the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP). The problem asks to select k out of m available items, so as to maximize the social welfare for autonomous agents with combinatorial preferences over subsets of items. The CPPP constitutes an abstract model for decision making by autonomous agents and has been shown to present severe computational hardness, in the design of truthful approximation mechanisms. We study two non-truthful mechanisms that are, however, practically relevant to multi-agent environments, by virtue of their simplicity. Both mechanisms employ an item bidding interface, wherein every agent issues a separate bid for the inclusion of each distinct item in the outcome; the k items with the highest sums of bids are chosen and agents are charged according to VCG-based payment rules. For expressive classes of the agents’ valuation functions, we establish existence of socially optimal pure Nash and strong equilibria, that are resilient to coordinated deviations of subsets of agents. Subsequently, we derive worst-case bounds on the approximation of the optimum social welfare achieved in equilibrium.
x Nash equilibria in bimatrix 5x4 games
Raimundas Vidunas, University of Athens

We establish the maximal number of Nash equilibria in bimatrix 5x4 games.
x Reliable Broadcast with Respect to Topology Knowledge
Giorgos Panagiotakos, National Technical University of Athens

We study the Reliable Broadcast problem in incomplete networks against a Byzantine adversary. We examine the problem under the locally bounded adversary model of Koo (2004) and the general adversary model of Hirt and Maurer (1997) and explore the tradeoff between the level of topology knowledge and the solvability of the problem. We refine the local pair-cut technique of Pelc and Peleg (2005) in order to obtain impossibility results for every level of topology knowledge and any type of corruption distribution. On the positive side we devise protocols that match the obtained bounds and thus, exactly characterize the classes of graphs in which Reliable Broadcast is possible. Among others, we show that Koo's Certified Propagation Algorithm (CPA) is unique against locally bounded adversaries in ad hoc networks, that is, it can tolerate as many local corruptions as any other non-faulty algorithm; this settles an open question posed by Pelc and Peleg. We also provide an adaptation of CPA against general adversaries and show its uniqueness in this case too. To the best of our knowledge this is the first optimal algorithm for Reliable Broadcast in generic topology ad hoc networks against general adversaries.
x Game Semantics for Logic Programming
Chrysida Galanaki, University of Athens

Joint work with C. Nomikos, P. Rondogiannis, and W. W. Wadge

We present infinite games of perfect information that capture the semantics of logic programs with negation and other non-monotonic operators. We consider the following cases: (i) Normal logic programs, that have a finite number of rules and negation-as-failure, (ii) Infinite logic programs, that have an infinite number of rules, and (iii) Intensional logic programs, that have non-monotonic intensional operators.
x Multiprocessor Speed Scaling with Precedence Constraints
Dimitris Letsios, Technical University of Munich

We consider the problem of scheduling a set of jobs, under precedence constraints, on a set of speed scalable parallel processors. The goal is to minimize the makespan of the schedule, i.e. the time at which the last job finishes its execution, without violating a given energy budget. This situation finds applications in computer devices whose life-time depends on a limited battery efficiency. In order to handle the energy consumption we use the energy model introduced in [Yao et al., FOCS’95], which captures the intuitive idea that the higher is the processor’s speed the higher is the energy consumption. We propose a (2-1/m)-approximation algorithm improving the best known poly-log(m)-approximation algorithm for the problem [Pruhs et al., TOCS 2008], where m is the number of the processors. We also extend the simple idea used for the above problem, in order to propose a generalized framework that finds applications to other scheduling problems in the speed scaling setting.
x Reductions from Mechanism to Algorithm Design
Costantinos Daskalakis, MIT

Algorithmic mechanism design centers around the following question: How much harder is optimizing an objective over inputs that are furnished by rational agents compared to when the inputs are known? We present computationally efficient reductions from mechanism design (i.e. optimizing over rational inputs) to algorithm design (i.e. optimizing over known inputs) in general Bayesian settings. We also explore whether structural properties about optimal mechanisms can be inferred from these reductions. As an application, we present extensions of Myerson's celebrated single-item auction to multi-item settings.
x Exclusive Graph Searching in Various Graph Classes
Euripides Markou, University of Thessaly

Joint work with Nicolas Nisse and Stephane Perennes

In Graph Searching, a team of searchers tries to capture an invisible fugitive who is moving arbitrary fast in a graph. Many variants of this problem have been studied with respect to the constraints that the searchers' strategy must satisfy. We study here the Exclusive Graph Searching problem in which two searchers can not occupy simultaneously a node. We will discuss the complexity of finding the minimum number of searchers capable of solving the problem in various classes of graphs. We show that the problem is NP-hard in planar graphs with maximum degree $3$. We will also present a graph family in which the problem of finding a monotone strategy of a minimum number of searchers remains NP-hard and some other graph families in which the problem can be solved in polynomial time.


First Name Last Name Affiliation
ChrisAdamoNational Technical University of Athens
GeorgiosAmanatidisAthens University of Economics and Business
KonstantinosAmeranisNational Technical University of Athens
ArisAnagnostopoulosSapienza University of Rome
AlexandrosAngelopoulosNational Technical University of Athens
AntonisAntonopoulosNational Technical University of Athens
SpyridonArgyroiliopoulosUniversity of Athens
SpyrosArgyroiliopoulosUniversity of Athens
MakisArsenisNational Technical University of Athens
CharalamposAsimakopoulosNational Technical University of Athens
GeorgiaAvarikiotiUniversity of Athens
KyriakosAxiotisNational Technical University of Athens
DimitriosBakasUniversity of Athens
KaterinaBaousiNational Technical University of Athens
PetrosBarbagiannisAthens University of Economics and Business
GiorgosBirbasAthens University of Economics and Business
KonstandinosBitsakosNational Technical University of Athens
MatthaiosBournazosNational Technical University of Athens
IoannisCaragiannisUniversity of Patras
AngelikiChalkiUniversity of Athens
Evangelos ChatziafratisNational Technical University of Athens
GiorgosChatziantoniouNational Technical University of Athens
PanagiotisCheilarisUniversità della Svizzera italiana
GiorgosChristodoulouUniversity of Liverpool
IliasDiakonikolasUniversity of Edinburgh
ChristinaDiamantopoulouΣΗΜΜΥ ΕΜÎ
Katerina DimitrakopoulouUniversity of Athens
SotiriosDimosNational Technological University of Athens
EleniEvangelatouNational Technical University of Athens
MariaFostiniNational Technical University of Athens
DimitrisFotakisNational Technical University of Athens
ChrysidaGalanakiUniversity of Athens
MyrtoGalenianouUniversity of Athens
PanagiotisGeorgakopoulosNational Technical University of Athens
EvangeliaGergatsouliNational Technical University of Athens
NikolaosGiachoudisUniversity of Thessaly
YiannisGiannakopoulosUniversity of Oxford
AgamemnonGiannakopoulosNational Technical University of Athens
VasilisGkatzelisStanford University
KostisGkionisNational Technical University of Athens
MariaGkoliaNational Technical University of Athens
VasilisGoumasNational Technical University of Athens
PanagiotisGrontasNational Technical University of Athens
FotiosGryllakisUniversity of Patras
KonstantinosKaffesNational Technical University of Athens
KanelaKaligosiUniversity of Athens
DimitriosKalogeropoulosNational Technical University of Athens
AlexandrosKalomoirosNational Technical University of Athens
KonstantinosKanellisUniversity of Thessaly
PavlosKapoutsisNational Technical University of Athens
GrigorisKaragiorgosTEI of Peloponnese
AnnaKarasoulouUniversity of Athens
ChristinaKarousatouNational Technical University of Athens
AngelosKatselisNational Technical University of Athens
LoukasKavourasNational Technical University of Athens
StefanosKoffasNational Technical University of Athens
ChristosKonaxisUniversity of Athens
VasilikiKontouraNational Technical University of Athens
PetrosKotsalasNational Technical University of Athens
NataliaKotsaniNational Technical University of Athens
EugeniaKotzapanagiotouUniversity of Patras
Grigorios KoumoutsosUniversity Paris Diderot
GeorgeKouroupasAthens University of Economics and Business
VlasisKoutsosNational Technical University of Athens
EliasKoutsoupiasUniversity of Oxford
MariosKouvarasNational Technical University of Athens
ChristinaKoziaUniversity of Patras
PanagiotisKyriazisNational Technical University of Athens
NikolaosLabrouUniversity of Athens
ZoiLamprakouNational Technical University of Athens
PhilipLazosNational Technical University of Athens
AlexandrosLeivaditisUniversity of Athens
KonstantinosLentzosUniversität Konstanz
NikosLeonardosUniversity of Athens
DimitriosLetsiosTechnical University of Munich
ThanasisLianeasNational Technical University of Athens
VasileiosLivanosNational Technical University of Athens
MichalisLoulakisNational Technical University of Athens
ThodorisLykourisCornell University
ChristianaLymouriNational Technical University of Athens
AndreasMaggioriNational Technical University of Athens
KonstantinaMakridakiAthens University Of Economics and Business
MichailMamakosUniversity of Macedonia
AndreasMantisNational Technical University of Athens
ConstantinosMarakosUniversity of Patras
KonstantinaMargaUniversity of Patras
AlexanderMargelisAthens University of Economics and Business
VangelisMarkakisAthens University of Economics and Business
EuripidesMarkouUniversity of Thessaly
ElenaMelachroinouUniversity of Patras
Faidra GeorgiaMonachouNational Technical University of Athens
AlexandrosMoschosNational Technical University Of Athens
AlexandraMoshouNational Observation of Athens
LamprosMousselimisNational Technical University of Athens
DimitriosMyrisiotisNational Technical University of Athens
IoannisNemparisNational Technical University of Athens
AikateriniNikolidakiNational Technical University of Athens
ArisPagourtzisNational Technical University of Athens
GerasimosPalaiopanosNational Technical University of Athens
GiorgosPanagiotakosNational Technical University of Athens
DimitriosPanagopoulosEureka Module
MariannaPanteliUniversity of Patras
OrestisPapadigenopoulosNational Technical University of Athens
GiorgosPapadimitriouUniversity of Athens
MariaPapadopoulouUniversity of Cyprus
VasileiosPapaefthymiouNational Technical University of Athens
KatiaPapakonstantinopoulouUniversity of Athens
KonstantinosPapanikolaouUniversity of Athens
GeorgiosPapastergiouNational Technical University of Athens
DespoinaPapatheodorouNational Technical University of Athens
GeorgeParaksevopoulosNational Technical University of Athens
NikosParotsidisUniversity of Ioannina
ElenaPartalidouUniversity of Crete
VangelisPaschosLAMSADE, University Paris-Dauphine
GeorgePatseasNational Technical University of Athens
KonstantinosPatsourakosUniversity of Athens
ChrystallaPavlouNational Technical University of Athens
MatoulaPetroliaUniversity of Nantes
PetrosPetropoulosNational Technical University of Athens
StavrosPetsalakisUniversity of Athens
ChristosPilichosUniversity of Athens
CharikleiaPodimataNational Technical University of Athens
PetrosPotikasNational Technical University of Athens
NikosProtopapasUniversity of Patras
DespoinaPsaradakiTechnical Educational Institute
IoannisPsarrosUniversity of Athens
EleniPyliaNational Technical University of Athens
MariaRevythiElectrical Engineer@Computer Scientist, researcher
GeorgiosRoutisNational Technical University of Athens
DimitrisSakavalasNational Technical University of Athens
MarioSaldingerNational and Kapodistrian University of Athens
EleniSapountziUniversity of Thessaly
Dimitris SchizasNational Technical University of Athens
BabisSchoinochoritisUniversity of Patras
EmmanouilSeferisNational Technical University of Athens
KyriakosSergisNational Technical University of Athens
AlkminiSgouritsaUniversity of Liverpool
Evangelos SigalasUniversity of Thessaly
IoannisSigalasUniversity of Athens
DimitrisSimosSBA Research
Georgios AristeidisSkarvelasNational Technical University of Athens
StratisSkoulakisNational Technical University of Athens
AleksandrosSobczykUniversity of Patras
EvaggelosSouldatosNational Technical University of Athens
Maria IoannaSpyrakouUniversity of Athens
BettyStatiriUniversity of Thessaly
Aikaterini-PanagiotaStoukaUniversity of Athens
OrestisTelelisAthens University of Economics and Business
PeliTeloniUniversity of Athens
IakovosThiraiosNational Technical University of Athens
LeonidasTsepenekasNational Technical University of Athens
DimitrisTsiprasNational Technical University of Athens
EvanthiaTsitsokaUniversity of Patras
PanagiotisTsokasUniversity of Patras
IoannisTzanakakisTechnical University of Crete
IsidorosTziotisUniversity of Athens
ThomaidaTzovaraAthens University of Economics and Business
CharilaosTzovasNational Technical University of Athens
PanagiotisVasilopoulosNational Technical University of Athens
SimonVellasNational Technical University of Athens
AngelinaVidaliDuke University
RaimundasVidunasUniversity of Athens
JohnViolosPhD Student
AristotelisVlachosNational Technical University of Athens
ChristosVlassopoulosAthens University of Economics and Business
Emmanouil VasileiosVlatakis GkaragkounisNational Technological University of Athens
PanagiotaVompiriAthens University Of Economics and Business
AlexandrosVoudourisUniversity of Patras
GeorgiosVountourakisUniversity of Athens
IoannisVrontakisUniversity of Patras
LefterisXenariosUniversity of Athens
GeorgeXenophontosNational Technical University of Athens
StathisZachosNational Technical University of Athens
LydiaZakynthinouNational Technical University of Athens
Nikolaos-RafailZampelisNational Technical University of Athens
ManolisZampetakisNational Technical University of Athens
NikolaosZarifisNational Technical University of Athens
GeorgeZirdelisNational Technical University of Athens
VassilisZissimopoulosUniversity of Athens


ACAC14 will take place in the Multimedia Amphitheater of the National Technical University of Athens, located in the basement of the building of NTUA's Central Library. See the map below:

Προβολή μεγαλύτερου χάρτη

You can arrive at the Central Library by various ways:

By public transport:

The easiest way is by taking the Blue Metro line and getting off at the "ΚΑΤΕΧΑΚΗ" station. Then take the bus 242, get off at stop "ΘΥΡΩΡΕΙΟ" and walk 5 minutes towards the Central Library.
Another option is to take the bus 140 from the "ΚΑΤΕΧΑΚΗ" metro station and get off at stop "ΠΟΛΥΤΕΧΝΕΙΟΥΠΟΛΗ". Then get into the campus and walk 10 minutes towards the Central Library.

By car:

You can use this google map to get directions from Alimou-Katechaki Avenue.

ACAC14 is sponsored partially by the European Union (European Social Fund-ESF) and Greek national funds through the Operational Program "Education and Lifelong Learning" of the National Strategic Reference Framework - Research Funding Program THALES (project ALGONOW).