
# Fundamental Properties of Cryptocurrency in Distributed Systems

# Lewis Tseng Boston College









32650.00





Data provided by Morningstar for Currency and Coinbase for Cryptocurrency




AtheCrypt 2021

\*

#### Jan. 2021

Decentralized Fault-tolerant

Secure




#### ways of sharing and storing information

Lewis Tseng (BC)



Decentralized Fault-tolerant Secure

... many other



ways of sharing and storing information

Lewis Tseng (BC)



#### **Fundamental Questions**

#### Blockchains and the Future of Distributed Computing [Herlihy PODC 17]

• No formal abstraction of these objects has been proposed

#### Formalizing and Implementing Distributed Ledger Objects [Anta et al. NETYS 18]

- What is the service that must be provided by a distributed ledger?
- What properties a distributed ledger must satisfy?
- What are the assumptions made by the protocols and algorithms on the underlying system?

Jan. 2021

Does a distributed ledger require a linked cryptocurrency?
 Lewis Tseng (BC)
 AtheCrypt 2021

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
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Jan. 2021


Does a distributed ledger require a linked cryptocurrency?
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 AtheCrypt 2021

# Why Blockchain is Hard?





#### Blockchain?




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#### Blockchain?





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# Blockchain? Block + Chain!







# Blockchain? Block + Chain!


In this talk, no crypto detail

- What Block?
- How to link?
- How secure?
- How to mine?

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# [in Distributed Computing]



Bitcoin on a high-level: In each round,


- Nodes exchange blocks (mining)
- Nodes "agree on" a block

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# [in Distributed Computing]







Bitcoin on a high-level: In each round,


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# [in Distributed Computing]




Lewis Tseng (BC)

# [in Distributed Computing]


**disagreement** ⇒ double-spending attack

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# [in Distributed Computing]


**disagreement** ⇒ double-spending attack



FLP Result [JACM 85]: Fault + Async. + Consensus = Impossible


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# Most common approach: Proof-of-XXX






# Is Consensus necessary?





# Is Consensus necessary? No






# The Consensus Number of a Cryptocurrency

Rachid Guerraoui, Petr Kuznetsov, Matteo Monti, Matej Pavlovic, Dragos-Adrian Seredinschi [PODC 2019]

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05574.pdf





#### Model

Asynchronous network:


Permissioned, static system:

Crash fault:

arbitrary message delay


a fixed set of nodes [1, ..., n]

up to f fail-stop failures







# **Cryptocurrency: Working Definition**




# **Cryptocurrency: Abstraction**



# Cryptocurrency: Counterfeit



# Cryptocurrency: Double-spend



### What is the (concurrent) data structure?

#### Asset transfer object [PODC 2019]

- Each node has an account
- ATO state: balance of each account
- Transfer(A,B,x):
  - Decrease A's account by x
  - $\circ \quad \mbox{ Increase B's account by } x$
- Read(A): return A's balance

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#### Valid transfer/transaction: Transfer(A,B,x)

- Invoked by A
- balance(A)  $\ge$  x

Lewis Tseng (BC)



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#### Valid transfer/transaction: Transfer(A,B,x)

- Invoked by A
- $balance(A) \ge x$  No overdraft

### Atomic Snapshot Object [Afek et al. JACM 93]


Object partitioned into n segments

Each segment is "owned" by a node (single-writer)

**Update**: write a value to own segment

**Scan**: read values from all segments -- take a snapshot

Operations linearizable -- a total order that follows the real-time order



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
**Scan**: read values from all segments -- take a snapshot

Operations linearizable -- a total order that follows the real-time order

ID	1	2	3
Value			

 Intuition:
 i's entry = <u>all outgoing</u> <u>transfers</u> at node i

ID	1	2	3
Value	{(1, 2, 100)}		





Read(A):

- $S \leftarrow AS.scan$
- Return A's balance in S

Intuition:
i's entry = <u>all outgoing</u> <u>transfers</u> at node i

ID	1	2	3
Value	{(1, 2, 100)}		



Read(A):

- $S \leftarrow AS.scan$
- Return A's balance in S

	Balance		
1	0		
2	100		
3	0		

 Intuition:
 i's entry = <u>all outgoing</u> <u>transfers</u> at node i

ID	1	2	3
Value	{(1, 2, 100)}		

#### Lewis Tseng (BC)



Read(A):

- $S \leftarrow AS.scan$
- Return A's balance in S

	Balance		
1	0		
2	50		
3	50		

Intuition:
i's entry = <u>all outgoing</u> <u>transfers</u> at node i

ID	1	2	3
Value	{(1, 2, 100)}	{(2, 3, 50)}	

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Read(A):

•  $S \leftarrow AS.scan$ 

• Return A's balance in S

	Balance	
1	0	
2	50	
3	50	

Transfer(A,B,x):

- $S \leftarrow AS.scan$
- If valid transaction: OP[A] ← OP[A] U {(A,B,x)} AS.update(OP[A])

ID	1	2	3
Value	{(1, 2, 100)}	{(2, 3, 50)}	

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Read(A):

- $S \leftarrow AS.scan$
- Return A's balance in S

	Balance	
1	0	
2	50	
3	50	

Transfer(A,B,x):

learn new incoming tx's

•  $S \leftarrow AS.scan$ 


#### If valid transaction: OP[A] ← OP[A] U {(A,B,x)} AS.update(OP[A])

ID	1	2	3
Value	{(1, 2, 100)}	{(2, 3, 50)}	

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
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
#### Example

#### Example

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#### ASO-based Cryptocurrency [PODC 2019]

Read(A):

- $S \leftarrow AS.scan$
- Return A's balance in S

	Balance		
1	0		
2	50		
3	50		

Transfer(A,B,x):

- S ← AS.scan
   If valid transaction:
  - $OP[A] \leftarrow OP[A] \cup \{(A,B,x)\}$ AS.update(OP[A])

ID	1	2	3
Value	{(1, 2, 100)}	{(2, 3, 50)}	

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#### ASO-based Cryptocurrency [PODC 2019]

Read(A):

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	Balance	
1	0	
2	50	
3	50	

Transfer(A,B,x):


- $S \leftarrow AS.scan$ 
  - If valid transaction: OP[A] ← OP[A] U {(A,B,x)} AS.update(OP[A])


#### Update A's outgoing tx's

ID	1	2	3
Value	{(1, 2, 100)}	{(2, 3, 50)}	

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
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




Node 1 Tran(1,2,100)


Example







 Node 3
 Read(2)
 3
 0

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


### So what?






# ASO can be implemented in asynchronous systems!






### It's all good, but ...





### Is it scalable and highly available?





#### CAP Theorem [Brewer PODC 00, Gilbert/Lynch 02]

### **Consistency**: right response to each request

**Availability**: termination eventually

#### **Partition tolerance**:

#### unreliable comm. network







#### CAP Theorem [Brewer PODC 00, Gilbert/Lynch 02]

right Impossible to have all three! **Consistency**: **Availability**: term When there is a partition, **Partition tolerance**: choose consistency or unre availability


















# Cryptocurrency in a Partitioned Network? (under submission)






## Key observation: Pending transactions (Delivered but not applied)









#### **Modern Bank**






#### **Modern Bank**



## Key tool: abstracting consistency guarantees





Operations

Transfer

Read

**Audit**: return the "validity proof" of all the outgoing transactions

Valid transaction: no double-spend, no counterfeit, no overdraft

Lewis Tseng (BC)

#### Properties

Eventual delivery: Tx from the same partition is eventually applied
Local operation: No communication needed to complete an operation
Read-my-write: Read reflects the effect of all the prior outgoing transfers

Auditability: One is able to present validity proof

Validity: All applied transactions are valid

#### Properties under **C**AP framework

**Eventual delivery**: Tx from the same partition is eventually applied

Local operation:

Read-my-write:

Auditability:

Validity:

No communication needed to complete an operation

Read reflects the effect of all the prior outgoing transfers

One is able to present validity proof

All applied transactions are valid

#### Properties under CAP framework

Eventual delivery: Tx from the same partition is eventually applied

Local operation.

No communication needed to complete an operation

Read-my-write:


Read reflects the effect of all the prior outgoing transfers

Auditability:


Validity:


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
# Thm1: Byzantine node + Eventual delivery + Partition-tolerance = impossible









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






# Thm1: Byzantine node + Eventual delivery + Partition-tolerance = impossible







#### Thm1: Byzantine node + Eventual delivery + Partition-tolerance = impossible **Don't apply:** violating eventual B Α Tran(A,B,1) delivery **Apply:** double-spend Tran(A,C,1) A



#### Causal consistency

#### [Ahamad et al. DC 95]

On a high-level, causal consistency lets each node observe the <u>entire causal</u> <u>history</u> (happens-before relation)



 $\textbf{Write1} \rightarrow \textbf{Read1}$ 

Lewis Tseng (BC)




#### Causal consistency

Lewis Tseng (BC)


#### [Ahamad et al. DC 95]

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


#### Thm2: Causal consistency is necessary





#### Thm2: Causal consistency is necessary



Audit() does NOT contain Tran(A,B,1)

 $\Rightarrow$  Node C violates auditability!

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#### **Positive Results**

#### **CCC: Causal Cryptocurrency under Crash faults**

• Similar to ASO-Crypto, but use causal memory underneath

#### **CCB: Causal Cryptocurrency under Byzantine faults**

- Byzantine causal memory [Tseng et al. NCA 19]
- Reliable broadcast [Bracha and Toueg JACM 85]
- Sequence number to stop double-spending
- PKI and digital signature
- A weaker form of eventual delivery:

one needs to be able to talk to n-f correct nodes

Lewis Tseng (BC)

#### Summary

ASO-Crypto: consensus not necessary

Our work: total order and strong consistency not necessary

causal consistency necessary

an inherent challenge of Byzantine crypto in partition


two implementations

#### **Future Works**

Implementation and evaluation

Permission-less systems

Probabilistic guarantees






#### Advice

Know fundamentals

- FLP
- CAP

Reach out to other communities

Be comfortable with formalism





# Thanks! Questions?

lewis.tseng@bc.edu

