


| 10:00 - 11:00 |
Learning Augmented Coordination Mechanisms
George Christodoulou, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and Archimedes AI
Abstract:
The inefficiency of decentralized resource allocation, a core challenge in Algorithmic Game Theory, is classically measured by the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS). The most widely studied and foundational class of these models are atomic and non-atomic congestion games, for which a robust theory quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria is well-established. To mitigate the effects of this selfish behavior, we employ Coordination Mechanisms, which modify resource costs to incentivize socially improved equilibrium outcomes. In their standard form, Coordination Mechanisms have been limited by a pessimistic, worst-case view; it is assumed that the demand is unknown and adversarially chosen. Consequently, positive results remain sparse, applying mainly to specialized network topologies like parallel links. We address this limitation by studying the design and analysis of learning-augmented coordination mechanisms, where the mechanism is endowed with a potentially inaccurate prediction of the demand. Short bio: George Christodoulou is a Professor in the School of Informatics at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. His research focuses on algorithmic aspects of game theory, mechanism design, optimization under uncertainty and fair division. He has been awarded a Royal Society Leverhulme Trust Senior Research Fellowship and has been a long-term Visiting Scholar in the Economics and Computation program at the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing at UC Berkeley. He previously held faculty positions at the University of Liverpool and University of Saarland. |
| 11:00 - 11:30 | Coffee break |
| 11:30 - 13:10 |
Contributed talks
11:30 — Facility Location for Congesting Commuters and Generalizing the Cost-Distance Problem
Thanasis Lianeas, University of West Attica
Abstract:
In Facility Location problems there are agents that should be connected to facilities and locations where facilities may be opened so that agents can connect to them. We depart from Uncapacitated Facility Location and by assuming that the connection costs of agents to facilities are congestion dependent, we define a novel problem, namely, Facility Location for Congesting (Selfish) Commuters. The connection costs of agents to facilities come as a result of how the agents commute to reach the facilities in an underlying network with cost functions on the edges. Inapproximability results follow from the related literature and thus approximate solutions is all we can hope for. For when the cost functions are nondecreasing we employ in a novel way an approximate version of Caratheodory's Theorem to show how approximate solutions for different versions of the problem can be derived. For when the cost functions are nonincreasing we show how this problem generalizes the Cost-Distance problem and provide an algorithm that for this more general case achieves the same approximation guarantees.
11:55 — Learning vs. Optimizing Bidders in Budgeted Auctions
Giannis Fikioris, Cornell University
Abstract:
The study of repeated interactions between a learner and a utility-maximizing optimizer has yielded deep insights into the manipulability of learning algorithms. However, existing literature primarily focuses on independent, unlinked rounds, largely ignoring the ubiquitous practical reality of budget constraints. In this paper, we study this interaction in repeated second-price auctions in a Bayesian setting between a learning agent and a strategic agent, both subject to strict budget constraints, showing that such cross-round constraints fundamentally alter the strategic landscape. First, we generalize the classic Stackelberg equilibrium to the Budgeted Stackelberg Equilibrium. We prove that an optimizer's optimal strategy in a budgeted setting requires time-multiplexing; for a $k$-dimensional budget constraint, the optimal strategy strictly decomposes into up to $k+1$ distinct phases, with each phase employing a possibly unique mixed strategy (the case of $k=0$ recovers the classic Stackelberg equilibrium where the optimizer repeatedly uses a single mixed strategy). Second, we address the intriguing question of non-manipulability. We prove that when the learner employs a standard Proportional controller (the "P" of the PID-controller) to pace their bids, the optimizer's utility is upper bounded by their objective value in the Budgeted Stackelberg Equilibrium baseline. By bounding the dynamics of the PID controller via a novel analysis, our results establish that this widely used control-theoretic heuristic is actually strategically robust. Short bio: Giannis Fikioris recently completed his PhD at the Computer Science Department of Cornell University, advised by Éva Tardos. He will soon start working as a Research Scientist at Google Research, Mountain View. Before that, he completed his diploma at NTUA, advised by Dimitris Fotakis.
12:20 — The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions in Graphs
Ioannis Vlachos, AUEB
Abstract:
We study truthful and non-truthful protocols for combinatorial auctions in which every item can be allocated to one of two agents (multigraphs), or more generally to a fixed number of agents (hypergraphs). We show some tight - both positive and impossibility - results for the communication complexity of approximating the optimal social welfare for general monotone, subadditive, or XOS valuations. Short bio: Ioannis Vlachos is a Ph.D. student under the guidance of George Christodoulou at Archimedes/RC Athena and Alkmini Sgouritsa at the Athens University of Economics and Business. His research interests lie primarily in Mechanism Design and Learning-Augmented Algorithms.
12:45 — Online Fair Division Meets Reordering Buffers
Nicos Protopapas, Archimedes AI
Abstract:
We study the online fair division of indivisible mixed goods and chores among agents with additive valuations. At each time step, an item arrives. Each agent may value it positively, negatively, or at zero, and it must be allocated before the next item arrives. We focus on envy-freeness (EF) and envy-freeness up to one item (EF1). Because strong fairness guarantees are difficult to achieve in the standard online setting, we allow algorithms to use a buffer that can temporarily store and rearrange a limited number of items. This model lies between the fully online case, with no buffer, and the fully offline case, where all items can be stored. We show that reasonably sized buffers provide strong fairness guarantees for personalized k-value instances, where each agent assigns at most k distinct values to the items. In particular, using a buffer whose size is linear in k and the number of agents, we construct allocations that are EF1 at every time step and EF at most time steps. Our approach uses new combinatorial arguments and a sequence of envy-free matchings that allocate most of the items. We also extend our results to general additive valuations, with guarantees depending on the largest ratio between two same-sign values assigned by an agent. Finally, we establish impossibility results showing the limitations of smaller buffers. Short bio: Nicos Protopapas is a researcher in theoretical computer science, specializing in algorithmic game theory, mechanism design, and fair division. He has held postdoctoral research positions at the Archimedes Unit in the Athena Research Center, the University of Southampton, and the University of Patras, and has taught at the University of the Aegean and the National Technical University of Athens. He received his PhD in Computer Science from the University of Liverpool. |
| 13:10 - 14:00 | Lunch break |
| 14:00 - 15:00 |
Algorithmic Fairness in Networks
Evaggelia Pitoura, University of Ioannina and Archimedes AI
Abstract:
Algorithmic decisions over networked data can exhibit systematic disparities that arise not only from node attributes, but also from structural properties, including homophily, preferential attachment, and community structure. In this talk, I will present our work on formalizing and mitigating network-based unfairness in two families of network algorithms. The first is connectivity-based fairness in community structures. I will discuss group modularity as a measure of disparities in within-group and cross-group connectivity, and fairness-aware community detection methods that balance structural quality with group-level fairness. I will also discuss the application of connectivity-based fairness to the densest subgraph problem and present our recent work on a counterfactual-based fairness notion for clustering. The second family concerns fair influence in networks, focusing on PageRank centrality and opinion formation. I will present fairness notions for PageRank, fairness-aware PageRank algorithms, and link recommendations for mitigating unfairness. I will then introduce fair opinion formation, which seeks to balance the influence of different groups on the final public opinion, and mitigation strategies based on modifying node stubbornness. Short bio: Evaggelia Pitoura is a Professor at the Department of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Ioannina and a Lead Researcher at Archimedes Research Unit, Athena RC, Greece. She holds a BEng degree from the University of Patras, Greece, and an MS and PhD from Purdue University, USA. Her current research interests focus on two primary areas: responsible data management, with a focus on fairness, explainability, and their interplay; and on graph exploration and analysis. For her work, she has received best paper awards, a Marie Curie Fellowship and two Recognition of Service Awards from ACM. She is an ACM senior member and founding chair of the Hellenic ACM SIGMOD chapter. |
| 15:00 - 15:30 | Coffee break |
| 15:30 - 16:45 |
Contributed talks
15:30 — Parameterized Capacitated Vertex Cover Revisited
Manolis Vasilakis, University of Southern Denmark
Abstract:
In this talk, we revisit the Capacitated Vertex Cover problem under the perspective of parameterized complexity. We answer several open questions from the literature regarding both its natural and structural parameterizations considering well-studied width measures such as treewidth and clique-width. Furthermore, we present an improved algorithm for the parameterization by vertex cover number, while also showing that any further improvements would imply corresponding progress for a broader class of integer-programming-type problems. Short bio: Manolis Vasilakis recently received his PhD in computer science from Universite Paris Dauphine - PSL, where he was supervised by Michael Lampis. He will soon join the University of Southern Denmark as a postdoctoral researcher working with Lars Rohwedder. His research lies at the intersection of parameterized complexity, approximation algorithms, and fine-grained complexity.
15:55 — EF(X) Orientations: A Parameterized Complexity Perspective
Sotiris Kanellopoulos, NTUA and Archimedes AI
Abstract:
The concept of fair orientations in graphs was introduced by Christodoulou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa in 2023, naturally modeling fair division scenarios in which resources are only contested by neighbors. In this model, vertices represent agents and undirected edges represent goods; edges have to be oriented towards one of their endpoints, i.e., allocated to one of their adjacent agents. Although EFX orientations (envy-free up to any good) have been extensively studied in this setting, EF orientations (envy-free) remain unexplored. In this work, we initiate their study, mostly under the lens of parameterized complexity, presenting various tractable cases, hardness results, and parameterizations. Our results concern both simple graphs and multigraphs. Interestingly, many of our results transfer to EFX orientations, thus complementing and improving upon previous work; notably, we answer an open question regarding the structural parameterized complexity of the latter problem on graphs of polynomially-bounded valuations. We also show that EF orientations are tractable in cases in which EFX orientations are not, particularly for binary valuations. Lastly, we consider charity in the orientation setting, establishing algorithms for finding the minimum amount of edges that have to be removed from a graph in order for EF(X) orientations to exist. Short bio: Sotiris Kanellopoulos is a final-year PhD student at the National Technical University of Athens, advised by prof. Aris Pagourtzis. His research is supported by a PhD fellowship from the Archimedes Research Unit. Sotiris' research interests include Computational Complexity, Algorithmic Game Theory, Algorithmic Graph Theory, Approximation Algorithms, and Scheduling. During his PhD Sotiris has worked on Periodic Scheduling problems, Fair Division, approximation schemes for variants of Subset Sum, Temporal Path and Cover problems, as well as Descriptive and Counting Complexity.
16:20 — Listing Even Cycles Faster than the Submodular-Width Barrier
Andreas Panayi, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens & National Technical University of Athens
Abstract:
A classic result of Alon, Yuster, and Zwick (AYZ, Algorithmica 1997) shows that all $2k$-cycles in an $m$-edge (directed or undirected) graph can be listed in $O(m^{2-1/k} + t)$ time, where $t$ is the output size. This bound is a starting point for the notion of submodular width due to Marx (JACM, 2013), and then the PANDA framework by Abo Khamis, Ngo, and Suciu (PODS, 2017), which generalize the AYZ result to arbitrary conjunctive queries and input degree constraints. A central open question is whether combinatorial algorithms can beat the submodular-width barrier. Bringmann and Gorbachev (STOC 2025) gave lower-bound evidence that submodular width may be optimal for general conjunctive queries under combinatorial algorithms. The picture changes, however, for $2k$-cycles on undirected graphs, whose corresponding queries have self-joins and symmetric input EDBs: recent works have improved on AYZ for even-cycle detection and listing. Pinning down the complexity of $C_{2k}$ -detection and listing is thus a natural step toward overcoming the submodular-width barrier for queries with self-joins or symmetric EDBs. With respect to the detection problem (a Boolean conjunctive query), Dahlgaard, Knudsen, and Stockel (STOC 2017) showed that $C_{2k}$ -detection can be solved in $O(m^{2k/(k+1)})$ time, improving on the AYZ bound. The even-cycle listing problem (a full conjunctive query) is more challenging. Recent works have made progress on small cycles. Jin and Xu (STOC 2023) (and independently Abboud, Khoury, Leibowitz, and Safier, FSTTCS 2023) showed that 4-cycles can be listed in $O(m^{4/3} + t)$ time, and Vassilevska Williams and Westover (ITCS 2025) showed that 6-cycles can be listed in $O(m^{8/5} + t)$ time; both results improve the corresponding AYZ bounds of $O(m^{3/2})$ and $O(m^{5/3})$, respectively. The general case, however, has remained open since the original AYZ paper some 30 years ago. In this paper, building on the works of Dahlgaard, Knudsen, and Stockel, and of Vassilevska Williams and Westover, we prove that 2k-cycles can be listed in $O(m^{(2k^2-k+1)/(k^2+1)} + t)$ time, improving the AYZ bound for every $k \geq 3$. The key technical ingredient is an asymmetric supersaturation result for even cycles. Additionally, our algorithms are expressed entirely in terms of join and project operators over multiple tree-decomposition query plans, making them naturally amenable to efficient implementation in database systems. This is in contrast to the breadth-first search (BFS)-based approaches in the prior graph algorithms literature. Short bio: Andreas Panayi holds a BSc in Mathematics from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (NKUA) and an MSc jointly from NKUA and the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA). He has previously conducted research at the Archimedes Unit of the Athena Research Center, as well as industry research with RINNOCO and the Cyprus Research and Innovation Foundation (RIF). His research interests lie in theoretical computer science, specifically algorithm design (parameterized and fine-grained), data structures (dynamic and geometric), computational complexity, and extremal graph theory. |
| 16:45 - 17:00 | Short break |
| 17:00 - 18:15 |
Contributed talks
17:00 — Binary Imbalanced Classification under Random Classification Noise
Dimitrios Diochnos, University of Oklahoma
Abstract:
We study binary classification in Leslie Valiant's Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) model of learning (Valiant, 1984) with the additional requirements of establishing high recall and high precision. We do so when the training examples have been corrupted by random classification noise as in the model by Angluin and Laird (1987). Under the assumption that a hypothesis space $\mathcal{H}$ is at least as expressive as the concept class $\mathcal{C}$ (that is, $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{H}$) we show that with a polynomial increase in the sample complexity of learning one can apply the empirical risk minimization (ERM) principle and learn a hypothesis that satisfies the PAC criterion with high recall and high precision. In order to establish this result we develop a subdivision algorithm for isolating the noise rate in a sufficiently small (user-defined) interval as well as a replicable noise-isolation procedure, both of which may have independent interest. This is work in progress jointly with Keng-Hung Steven Lin and Ting-Hung Yu. Short bio: Dr Dimitrios Diochnos is an Associate Professor in the School of Computer Science at the University of Oklahoma. The research of Dr Diochnos focuses on theoretical and practical aspects of trustworthy supervised and semi-supervised learning. Dr Diochnos earned his PhD in Mathematical Computer Science from the University of Illinois at Chicago, his Master's in Mathematics from the University of Athens (Greece) and his B.S. in Informatics and Telecommunications from the University of Athens (Greece). - Departmental webpage: https://www.ou.edu/coe/cs/people/faculty/dimitrios-diochnos - Professional webpage: https://www.diochnos.com
17:25 — Fundamentals for Binary Classification under Label Noise
Dimitrios Diochnos, University of Oklahoma
Abstract:
This is a chapter of a forthcoming book marking the 35th anniversary of the International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics (ISAIM). We survey fundamental results for binary classification under label noise. Binary classification under label noise involves training models on datasets where class labels are partially incorrect, leading to degraded performance and misclassification. We distinguish poisoning attacks from noise processes and formalize random classification noise, Massart noise, and malicious classification noise within the probably approximately correct (PAC) framework. These models capture different adversarial strengths and data-generation realities. We then highlight some core ideas and representative results. In particular, we explain why random classification noise preserves the expected ordering of hypotheses and thus supports learning using the empirical risk minimization (ERM) principle, how sample complexity depends on the noise rate, and why learning algorithms often require an upper bound on the corruption level, as well as how such a bound may be estimated from data in the case of random classification noise. We also discuss computational aspects of ERM under noise and present a canonical negative result technique---the method of induced distributions---within the malicious noise model where the adversary has more power and may affect not only the label of an example but also the instance. We conclude with pointers to related work and a taxonomy that organizes classical label-noise models using the NCAR/NAR/NNAR lens. Short bio: Dr Dimitrios Diochnos is an Associate Professor in the School of Computer Science at the University of Oklahoma. The research of Dr Diochnos focuses on theoretical and practical aspects of trustworthy supervised and semi-supervised learning. Dr Diochnos earned his PhD in Mathematical Computer Science from the University of Illinois at Chicago, his Master's in Mathematics from the University of Athens (Greece) and his B.S. in Informatics and Telecommunications from the University of Athens (Greece). - Departmental webpage: https://www.ou.edu/coe/cs/people/faculty/dimitrios-diochnos - Professional webpage: https://www.diochnos.com
17:50 — The Cost of Public Updates: Distinct-Signer Counting Requires Linear-Size Digests
Giorgos Tsimos, Pod Network
Abstract:
The best known deterministic Byzantine Broadcast protocol tolerating any $t<n$ corruptions remains Dolev-Strong. Its multi-signature implementation communicates $O(n^2\kappa+n^3)$ bits for $\kappa$-bit values, where the cubic term is carried by signer bitmaps. We isolate the certificate primitive suggested by this bottleneck: a digest that a third party can extend using only the digest and one new signature, and that subsequently certifies from the digest alone how many distinct committee members have signed so far. We prove that, under perfect correctness over the full support of setup, keys, and signing, computational soundness forces such a digest to have length at least $\log_2\binom{n}{n/2}-o(1)=n-O(\log n)$ bits. The proof gives a uniform replay-and-test adversary: public updateability turns an instance-dependent collision into an efficiently produced over-counting certificate, overcoming the fresh-instance obstacle in the closest prior information-theoretic bound of Hartung et al. (PKC~2016). The result assumes neither deterministic signing nor public verifiability; statistical correctness over signature randomness remains open. We also prove an $\Omega(n)$ bound for constant-factor approximate counting under statistical reachability soundness, while leaving its computational analogue open. For the standard optimized Dolev-Strong forwarding pattern, an ideal short digest would reduce communication to $O(n^2\kappa)$, whereas the lower bound shows the cubic term is unavoidable under certificate substitution: every Dolev-Strong-skeleton protocol whose certificate scheme satisfies our hypotheses incurs $\Omega(n^3)$ bits in the worst case --- unlike the general relay-update corollary, this statement needs no separate delivery-profile assumption. More generally, we obtain a conditional cubic bound for relay-update protocols that deliver $\Omega(n^2)$ high-threshold certificates. Short bio: Giorgos Tsimos is a research scientist at Pod Network, working on consensus protocols, cryptography, and blockchain systems. He holds a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Maryland (partially completed while a research visitor at Yale), where he was co-advised by Charalampos Papamanthou and Jonathan Katz. His dissertation focused on Byzantine consensus protocols and their efficiency under strong adversarial conditions. His research spans communication-efficient broadcast, lower bounds for authenticated consensus, and the design and formal analysis of high-throughput distributed protocols. |